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The Three Goals of Taxation
REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH*
I. INTRODUCTION
The current debate in the United States about whether the income
tax should be replaced with a consumption tax has been waged on the
traditional grounds for evaluating tax policy: efficiency, equity, and
administrability. For example, Joseph Bankman and David Weisbach
recently argued for the superiority of an ideal consumption tax over
an ideal income tax on three grounds: First, that the consumption tax
is more efficient because it does not discriminate between current and
future consumption,' while both income and consumption taxes have
identical effect on work effort. Second, that the consumption tax is at
least as good at redistribution as the income tax, and thus can equally
satisfy vertical equity.2 Third, that the consumption tax is easier to
administer than the income tax because it makes no attempt to tax
income from capital and thus can omit many of the vexing complica-
tions that arise from such an attempt, like accounting for basis.3
One can agree or disagree with Bankman and Weisbach, and this
debate will no doubt go on.4 For the sake of the argument, however,
* Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, the University of Michigan. I would like to thank
Richard Ainsworth, Anne Alstott, Bill Andrews, Steve Bank, Michael Barr, Richard Bird,
David Duff, Yosef Edrey, Michael Graetz, Dan Halperin, David Hasen, Jim Hines, Louis
Kaplow, Robert Kuttner, Kyle Logue, Yoram Margaliyot, Alex Raskolnikov, Jim Repetti,
Diane Ring, Julie Roin, David Schizer, Dan Shaviro, Reed Shuldiner, Joel Slemrod, Jeff
Strnad, Dennis Ventry, David Weisbach, and participants in the 2005 Harvard Seminar on
Current Research in Taxation and in workshops at the University of Toronto and Tel Aviv
University for their helpful comments.
1 Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax
over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1413, 1423, 1425 (2006).
2 Id. at 1428-30.
3 Id. at 1418.
4 Part II addresses the argument in regard to redistribution. In regard to efficiency,
Bankman and Weisbach rely on a 1976 paper by Atkinson and Stiglitz to argue that it is
incorrect to claim that there is a trade-off between reducing the disincentive to save by
adopting a consumption tax, and reducing the incentive to work by increasing taxes on
wages (to replace revenue lost as a result of exempting income from savings). Id. at 1414,
1420, 1422-28; A.B. Atkinson & J.E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versus
Indirect Taxation, 6 J. Pub. Econ. 55 (1976). For an example of the argument for the trade-
off theory, see Jane Gravelle, The Economic Effects of Taxing Capital Income 11-50
(1994). Bankman and Weisbach argue that the trade-off theory is untrue because the tax
on income from savings also reduces work effort. Bankman & Weisbach, note 1, at 1422.
But it is quite plausible to assume that people systematically value future taxes less than
current taxes by more than the time value of money, and, if so, the current tax on wages
1
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assume that an ideal consumption tax is indeed superior to an ideal
income tax on all three fronts. Given this outcome, two puzzles pre-
sent themselves, which have not received much attention in the cur-
rent debate: First, why do most developed countries employ both
income and consumption taxes, and more specifically, the value-added
tax (VAT)? 5 And second, after having employed only consumption
taxes at the federal level for over a century spanning the Jefferson to
the Taft administrations, with the exception of the short-lived Civil
War income tax,6 why did the United States switch to taxing primarily
income for most of the past century?
Both of these questions are puzzling if the consumption tax is
clearly superior to the income tax on traditional policy grounds. One
could argue that this superiority was not clearly understood when the
United States switched from taxing consumption to income in 1913. It
would still be interesting, however, to consider what the framers of the
Sixteenth Amendment thought they were achieving by its adoption.
Why would anyone ever consider replacing a well-functioning con-
sumption tax, which was bringing in adequate revenue, with an unt-
ested income tax?
The action of other OECD member countries is even more puzzling
in this regard. After all, some of them, including Canada, Australia,
and Japan, have adopted VATs quite recently,7 after the economic
case for the consumption tax had become established and even after it
will reduce work effort by more than the present value of the future tax on savings. Bank-
man and Weisbach seem to acknowledge this concept ("[p]erhaps one can offer various
psychological theories for why people misperceive the effect of various taxes"), but dismiss
it (because "the trade-off theory purports to apply standard economics"). Id. at 1424 n.22.
The debate, however, is about the effects in the real world of replacing the income tax with
a consumption tax, not in some ideal realm of classical economics. Similarly, the argument
in regard to administrability depends crucially on the actual consumption tax that will be
adopted. The experience of other countries with the VAT indicates it has significant
problems of complexity and administrability. See, e.g., Peggy B. Musgrave, Consumption
Tax Proposals in an International Setting, 54 Tax L. Rev. 77 (2000) (discussing the interna-
tional aspects of use of broad-based consumption taxes as alternatives to income taxes in
the United States). For replies to some of Bankman and Weisbach's other arguments (for
example, about taxation of risky investments), see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Risk, Rents and
Regressivity: Why the United States Needs Both an Income Tax and a VAT, 105 Tax
Notes 1651 (Dec. 20, 2004).
5 See Avi-Yonah, note 4, at 1651; OECD, Revenue Statistics 1965-2005, at 108-98
tbls.42-71 (2006) (of the thirty OECD member countries, twenty-nine have a VAT and
some form of income tax).
6 See John F. Witte, The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax 67-70
(1985) (discussing enactment of the first federal income tax in 1861 and events leading to
repeal of the Civil War income taxes in 1872).
7 OECD, Consumption Tax Trends: VAT/GST and Excise Rates, Trends and Adminis-
tration Issues 30 tbl.3.5 (2006) [hereinafter Consumption Tax Trends] (Australia imple-
mented VAT/GST in 2000, Canada in 1992, and Japan in 1990).
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had made its way into the legal literature. 8 And yet, instead of substi-
tuting a consumption tax in lieu of their existing income tax, these
countries all followed the lead of other OECD members and adopted
a consumption tax in addition to their income tax.9
To answer these puzzles, it is necessary to resurrect a question that
has not been considered recently in the tax policy literature: What are
taxes for?
The obvious answer is that taxes are needed to raise revenue for
necessary governmental functions, such as the provision of public
goods. And, indeed, all taxes have to fulfill this function to be effec-
tive; as the Russian government discovered in the 1990's1° (following
many others in history), a government that cannot tax cannot survive.
And there is widespread ideological agreement that this function is
needed, even while people vehemently disagree about what functions
of government are truly necessary, and what size of government is
required."
But taxation also has two other functions, which are more contro-
versial, but which modern states also widely employ. Taxation can
have a redistributive function, aimed at reducing the unequal distribu-
tion of income and wealth that results from the normal operation of a
market-based economy. This function of taxation has been hotly de-
bated over time, and different theories of distributive justice can be
used to affirm or deny its legitimacy. What cannot be denied, how-
ever, is that many developed nations in fact have sought to use taxa-
tion for redistributive purposes, although it also is debated how
effective taxation was (or can be) in redistribution.1 2
Taxation also has a regulatory component: It can be used to steer
private sector activity in the directions desired by governments. This
function is also controversial, as shown by the debate around tax ex-
penditures.1 3 But it is hard to deny that taxation has been and still is
8 See, e.g., William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income
Tax, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1113 (1974); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate
Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does it Matter?,
47 Tax L. Rev. 377 (1992).
9 OECD, Revenue Statistics, note 5, at 108-98 tbls.42-71.
10 Meltdown in Russia, Economist, Aug. 29, 1998, at 47.
11 Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Equity Versus Efficiency and the U.S. Tax System in Historical
Perspective, in Tax Justice: The Ongoing Debate 25, 25-62 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis
J. Ventry Jr. eds., 2002).
12 Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution Via Taxation: The Limited Role of
the Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1627 (2005).
13 See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National
Budget, 22 Nat'l Tax J. 244, 260 (1969) (discussing the view that tax expenditures should
not be included in the national budget based on the inability to accurately quantify the
associated costs for lack of an agreed conceptual model of federal income tax); Stanley S.
Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures (1985) (discussing the historical develop-
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used widely for this purpose, as shown inter alia by the spread of the
tax expenditure budget around the world following its introduction in
the United States in the 1970's. 14
These three functions can even be discerned in the current effort to
reform the U.S. tax system. The two guidelines that President Bush
gave to the Tax Reform Panel were revenue neutrality (any reform
has to preserve the current stream of federal revenues) and preserving
certain tax expenditures (specifically, the mortgage interest deduction
and the charitable deduction, both of which have clear regulatory
goals).1 5 The Tax Reform Panel Report explains in great length the
distributive impact of its proposals.1 6
This Article argues that the answer to the two puzzles of wide-
spread use of both income and consumption taxes globally, and of the
historical shift in the United States toward the income tax, is based on
these three functions of taxation. Specifically, to achieve the goals of
raising adequate revenue in an effective way, reducing unequal distri-
butions of wealth, and regulating market activity, a pure consumption
tax is not sufficient. Instead, an income or wealth tax is needed, but
because of the well-known problems of taxing income or wealth, a
consumption tax is needed as well. Thus, the ideal tax system will
include both income and consumption taxes, and it is thus not surpris-
ing that every single OECD member country except the United
States, and most developing countries, rely on both types of tax.
Thus, there is a mistaken premise underlying the current tax reform
debate in the United States: that we need to choose between having
an income tax and having a consumption tax. This is the premise un-
derlying most of the voluminous tax reform literature.17 Instead, I
would argue that (like most countries) the United States needs both
types of tax, and therefore the correct path to tax reform is not to
ment of the uses of tax expenditures and the impact on budget policy, tax policy, and
administration, and government decisions with respect to the use of tax expenditures or
direct spending to implement subsidy programs).
14 Surrey & McDaniel, note 13, at 177-81.
15 Report of the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair, &
Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America's Tax System 42-49, 70 (Nov. 2005) [hereinafter
Tax Reform Panel Report].
16 Id. at 175-264; for further discussion, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Report of the
President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform: A Critical Assessment and a Proposal,
59 SMU L. Rev. 551 (2006).
17 See, e.g., Andrews, note 8, at 1165; Alvin C. Warren, Fairness and a Consumption-
Type or Personal Income Tax, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 931, 932-46 (refuting arguments for a pure
consumption-type tax in favor of an accretion-type income tax). For proposals that involve
a combination of a consumption tax and some type of tax on capital, see Michael Graetz,
100 Million Unnecessary Returns, A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 Yale L.J. 261
(2002) (income tax plus VAT); Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth
Tax, 53 Tax L. Rev. 423 (2000) (consumption tax plus wealth tax); and Tax Reform Panel
Report, note 15, at 136 (proposing a partial consumption tax with a tax on capital income).
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substitute a consumption tax in lieu of the income tax, but to adopt a
consumption tax (and specifically, a VAT) in addition to the income
tax.18
The rest of this Article advances the above argument in detail. Part
II explains why as a matter of raising revenue the combination of in-
come and consumption taxes is superior to either of them standing
alone. Part III lays out why both income and consumption taxes can
play a major role in redistribution. Part IV delineates how both in-
come and consumption taxes can fulfill regulatory functions. Part V
concludes by drawing implications for U.S. tax policy.
II. REVENUE
"Taxes are what we pay for a civilized society ......
Oliver Wendell Holmes19
From a pure revenue-raising perspective, it is reasonably clear that
in the current U.S. context, a consumption tax can be devised that will
raise as much revenue as the existing income tax does. While some of
the current proposals for a federal consumption tax, such as a national
sales tax to be administered by the states, are likely to fall far short of
this goal, other proposals (like the flat tax or the cash flow tax) are
more likely to fulfill any mandate of revenue neutrality. 20
In fact, consumption taxes have a very good track record in terms of
raising revenue. The VAT, specifically, is second only to the individ-
ual income tax in its ability to raise revenue in most OECD member
countries, and in some it raises more revenue than the income tax. In
Western European countries, for example, the individual income tax
accounted in 1996-2002 for 32% of total tax revenue, compared with
30% for the VAT. 21 If one adds excises and the corporate income tax,
total income taxes account for 44% of all government revenues in the
same period, while consumption taxes account for 49%.22 In North
America, on the other hand, income taxes accounted for 82% of all
18 For a similar recent proposal by a bipartisan group, see Committee for Economic
Development, A New Tax Framework: A Blueprint for Averting a Fiscal Crisis 25 (2005)
(advocating a 10% VAT in addition to the income tax). The Tax Reform Panel Report,
however, rejected a proposal for a "partial replacement VAT," primarily because it might
lead to a higher share of government in GDP. See Tax Reform Panel Report, note 15, at
203.
19 Compania Gen. de Tobacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87,
100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
20 For an analysis of these proposals, see Avi-Yonah, note 4, at 1660-62.
21 Bird & Zolt, note 12, at 1655 tbl.A.
22 Id.
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revenue for the same period, and only 15% came from consumption
taxes (including state level sales taxes). 23
Moreover, the VAT has been successful in raising revenue even in
developing countries with weak tax administrations, which are largely
unable to collect the personal income tax from the majority of the
population. In Latin America, for example, consumption taxes ac-
counted for 52% of total revenue in 1996-2002, compared to only 27%
for (mostly corporate) income taxes; in Africa the figures for the same
period were 35% for consumption taxes, 32% for taxes on interna-
tional trade (which are equivalent to consumption taxes), and 30% for
income taxes.2 4 For all developing countries in 1999-2001, income
taxes accounted for only 24.3% of total tax revenue, compared to
38.6% for all developed countries; the remaining revenue was mostly
based on consumption taxes.2 5
Given this track record, it is not surprising that every OECD mem-
ber country other than the United States, and the vast majority of
developing countries, use consumption taxes (primarily the VAT) as a
major revenue raising tool.26 In fact, one could argue that the most
important tax policy development in the second half of the twentieth
century was the triumphant march of the VAT from a tentative experi-
ment in the 1950's to virtual global adoption.2 7
What is surprising, however, is the resilience of the income tax in
developed countries (and to some extent, in developing countries as
well). Why is it that all of these countries, including sophisticated
economies with tax policy analysts who were well aware of the argu-
ments for the superiority of consumption taxes on all the traditional
tax policy domains, rejected precisely the tax reform that currently is
being debated in the United States, namely replacing the income tax
with a consumption tax?
The answer lies in another development of the second half of the
twentieth century: the rise of the welfare state. In the same period
that governments were considering whether to adopt a consumption
tax, the overall size of the public sector as a percentage of GDP in
23 Id. These numbers do not include payroll taxes (such as the Social Security tax in the
United States). As a political matter revenues from such taxes need to be devoted to
funding social insurance programs, and they cannot be raised significantly, so they are ig-
nored in the rest of this Article.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1657 fig.2.
26 Alan Schenk & Oliver Oldman, Value Added Tax: A Comparative Approach in The-
ory and Practice 25-28, 27 n.58 (2001).
27 Id.
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OECD member countries rose from 27% in 1960 to 48% in 1996.28
The principal reason for this rise is the adoption and expansion of
universal pension and health insurance programs by OECD countries
in the years immediately following World War 11.29 During the war,
governments in all developed countries used the crisis to greatly ex-
pand their income tax collections, converting what was a "class tax"
on the rich to a "mass tax" enforced by withholding on the majority of
the population.30 After the war ended, instead of reducing rates to
pre-war levels (as happened to some extent after World War 1),31 gov-
ernments used the expanded revenue base to offer universal entitle-
ment programs (the "cradle to grave" social insurance safety net).32
These programs proved highly popular with voters, but also very
expensive, especially as the post-war baby boomers began to age. 33
Already in the 1970's, governments in Europe began feeling the dem-
ographic crunch that currently is reaching its peak, and it became
clear that to maintain the programs adopted in the flush post-war
years, additional revenue would be needed.34 In the 1980's, the pres-
sures of globalization were added as governments liberalized and
opened their economies.
Theoretically, governments could have responded by trying to raise
more revenue from the existing income tax. At the same time, how-
ever, various economic studies were documenting the negative incen-
tive effects of high income tax rates. 35 Following the U.K. and U.S.
tax reforms in the 1980's, it became widely accepted economic ortho-
doxy that very high income tax rates like those that prevailed in all
OECD countries before 1980 were too costly in terms of their impact
on economic performance. 36 Moreover, experience with high rates
had shown that they lead to increased tax evasion and avoidance ef-
forts.37 Thus, in the period between 1976 and 1997, most OECD
member countries reduced marginal income tax rates (by an average
28 James Gwartney, Robert Lawson & Randall Halcombe, Joint Econ. Comm., The Size
and Functions of Economic Growth 2 Exhibit 1 (Comm. Print 1998), available at www.
house.gov/jec/growth/function/function.htm [hereinafter JEC Report].
29 See Sven Steinmo, Taxes and Democracy (1993).
30 Sven Steinmo, The Evolution of Policy Ideas: Tax Policy in the 20th Century, 5 Brit. J.
Politics and Int'l Rel. 206, 212-13 (2003).
31 Id. at 210.
32 Steinmo, note 29, at 120.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 Yale L.J. 259,
273 (1983) (discussing incentive effects of increasing income tax rates).
36 See Steinmo, note 29.
37 See Graetz, note 35.
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of 21%), while preserving revenue neutrality by expanding the income
tax base.38
Given these developments, especially in conjunction with the pres-
sure of tax competition and globalization in the period after 1980, it
was clear to most OECD governments that an additional revenue
base other than the income tax needed to be exploited if the social
welfare safety net that originally was constructed with income tax rev-
enues was to be maintained in the face of an aging population and the
insecurities of globalization. The VAT, which originally was adopted
as a minor tax to finance the European Economic Community, 39
proved to be the ideal tax for this purpose. Hence the widespread
adoption of VATs, and gradual increase of VAT rates, first in Europe,
and then in non-European OECD countries and in developing
countries.40
This, therefore, is a partial answer to the first puzzle: A principal
reason why most OECD economies adopted both income and con-
sumption taxes is their fundamental commitment to the principle of
ensuring a social safety net for all their citizens. The tax policy impli-
cations of this fundamental commitment flow from its budgetary con-
sequences and from the efficiency and administrability constraints on
raising too much revenue from either income or consumption taxes.
If the rates are too high, this will both discourage economic activity
and lead to increased avoidance and evasion efforts, resulting in
slower growth and more wasted resources, but not necessarily higher
revenues. This holds true for consumption taxes as well as for income
taxes. Experience in Europe has shown that very high VAT rates can
have similar negative consequences to very high income tax rates.41
Hence, both income and consumption taxes are needed to fund the
social safety net.42 The main reason for that is administrability. Expe-
rience from all the other OECD countries has shown that more reve-
nue can be raised from a combination of an income tax and a
consumption tax than either alone, even though there is some overlap
in the base of the tax.
38 Steinmo, note 30, at 222 tbl.3.
39 Schenk & Oldman, note 26, at 26.
40 On the origins and spread of VAT, see Liam Ebril, Michael Keen, Jean-Paul Bodin &
Victoria Summers, The Modern VAT 4-8 (2001); Alan A. Tait, Value Added Tax: Interna-
tional Practice and Problems 19-30 (1988); Adrian Ogley, Principles of Value Added Tax
27-41 (1998); Alan Schenk, Value Added Tax: A Model Statute and Commentary 1 (1989);
Schenk & Oldman, note 26, at 26-27.
41 See Tait, note 40, at 39-48.
42 Payroll taxes (a form of wage tax, and hence equivalent to a consumption tax) also
have been widely used in OECD countries to fund social welfare programs. Jonathan R.
Kesselman, Payroll Taxes and Social Security, 22 Canadian Pub. Pol'y 162, 166 (1996).
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One could argue that this line of analysis is irrelevant to the current
U.S. debate. After all, our federal public sector is currently funded
almost entirely from income taxation (or, more precisely, a hybrid in-
come/consumption tax). As stated above, it is reasonably clear that a
properly constructed consumption tax can raise the same revenue as
the current income tax, so that we could substitute one for the other at
no significant cost. If we later need more revenue, we could then add
an income tax to the existing consumption tax (since relying on either
income or consumption taxes alone would not be sufficient, as the Eu-
ropean and worldwide experience has shown).
This argument, however, ignores the political reality of tax reform.
The United States currently has a hybrid income/consumption tax. If
we now proceed to replace it with a pure consumption tax, it seems
highly unlikely that in the future we will be able to easily reinstate the
income tax, especially given that the most feasible current consump-
tion tax proposals are deliberately camouflaged to look like an income
tax. (The reason for this is discussed in the conclusion).
Thus, I would argue that the reason that some conservative Repub-
licans want to replace the income tax with a consumption tax,43 and
are opposed to proposals (like the one advanced by Michael Graetz) 44
to adopt both, is precisely that they want to foreclose the possibility
that the U.S. government sector will expand. Our government sector
was only 31.7% of GDP in 2004, which is among the lowest in the
OECD and significantly below the OECD average.45 We can indeed
fund our current public sector by either an income or a consumption
tax, so that under current conditions replacing one with the other
seems a plausible alternative.
As has been widely noted, however, current conditions are not sus-
tainable in the longer run: In part, as a result of existing mandated
but unfunded entitlement programs, the federal government faces an
actuarial deficit of about $1.8 trillion in the next 10 years.46 This order
of magnitude cannot be funded with either the existing income tax or
by a consumption tax standing alone, because the incentive effects of
raising rates high enough to fund the deficit are unacceptable. As the
other OECD countries have discovered, to fund this type of social
safety net, both the income tax and a consumption tax are needed.
43 See David E. Rosenbaum, Tax Panel Says Popular Breaks Should Be Cut, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 12, 2005, at Al (noting that many prominent conservatives favor the consump-
tion tax).
44 See Graetz, note 17, at 282-84.
45 OECD, OECD in Figures-2006-2007 Edition 58-59 tbl. (2006), available at http://
www.oecdobserver.org/news/get-file.php3/id/25/file/OECDInFigures2006-2007.pdf
46 Cong. Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: A Study 1-2 & tbl.1-1
(2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov./ftpdocs/74xx/doc7492/08-17-BudgetUpdate.pdf.
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To a conservative Republican, of course, this argument is com-
pletely unpersuasive, because she is not interested in maintaining the
existing U.S. social safety net, and would certainly reject proposals to
expand it. Indeed, she probably would prefer shrinking it further, and
believes the solution to the actuarial deficits problem is cutting the
entitlement programs.
But for a Democrat, the revenue argument is an important reason
to reject the current tax reform proposals. If the United States re-
places the income tax with a consumption tax, this would make it po-
litically much more difficult to readopt the income tax in the future.
And both an income tax and a consumption tax will be needed to fund
the existing social safety net in the United States, which has near uni-
versal support among Democrats. Hence, the revenue argument is a
strong reason for Democrats to reject proposals to replace the income
tax with a consumption tax.
III. REDISTRIBUTION
"The case for drastic progression in taxation must be rested
on the case against inequality. '47
Henry Simons
The revenue goal of taxation thus explains why all other OECD
members, and most other countries, have both an income tax and a
consumption tax as their principal sources of revenue. But this still
leaves the second puzzle-why would any country change from rely-
ing primarily on consumption taxes to relying primarily on income
taxes? This is what the United States did when it adopted the Six-
teenth Amendment in 1913. Throughout the nineteenth century, with
the brief exception of the Civil War and its immediate aftermath
(1862-1872),48 the federal government was funded entirely by tariffs
(that is, taxes on consumption). 49 Following the passage of the Six-
teenth Amendment (authorizing the federal government to levy taxes
on income without apportionment), the United States began levying
an income tax, and from World War II onward this became the princi-
pal source of revenue of the U.S. federal government.50 Even when
taking the state level sales taxes into account, income taxes currently
account for over 80% of total U.S. tax revenue.51
47 Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation 18 (1938).
48 W. Elliott Brownlee, Historical Perspective on U.S. Tax Policy Toward the Rich, in
Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich 29, 33-35 (Joel B.
Slemrod ed., 2000).
49 Id. at 32.
50 Id. at 41-42 & tbl.2.1, 44.
51 See Bird & Zolt, note 12.
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Historically, the answer to the question of why the change to an
income tax occurs is clear: The income tax was substituted for the
tariffs because of its redistributive impact. The post-Civil War indus-
trialization and urbanization had led to a shift from a mostly agrarian
society to one dominated by large industrial corporations and a sharp
rise in inequality, as measured by the distribution of income or
wealth.52 Lawmakers of both parties viewed this state of affairs as
inequitable, 53 and the existing tax system was considered ineffective in
remedying the situation because it relied completely on consumption
taxes, which were regarded as regressive because the poor consume a
higher proportion of their income than the rich.54 In addition, state
level personal property taxes were seen as ineffective in reaching in-
tangible forms of property such as stocks and bonds,55 which formed
the bulk of the new wealth in the hands of the industrialists. 56
The result was a focused and sustained effort to enact a federal in-
come tax on both individuals and corporations, as well as an estate
tax. In 1895 the Supreme Court blocked the first attempt to do so,57
but Congress ultimately enacted the corporate tax in 1909,58 the mod-
ern estate tax in 1916, 59 and the individual income tax in 191360 after
the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment abated concerns regarding
its constitutionality. 61
Significantly, until World War II, the income tax applied only to the
richest Americans, because the exemption levels were set high enough
to leave the bottom 90% of the population outside the reach of the
income tax. 62 Redistribution was considered to require only taxing
the rich, and beginning in World War I, the rich were subject to in-
come tax at very high rates.63 After a period of rate reductions in the
1920's, 64 Elliott Brownlee shows that by World War II, this "soak the
rich" 65 tax policy resulted in quite high effective tax rates on the top
52 Richard J. Joseph, The Origins of the American Income Tax: The Revenue Act of
1894 and its Aftermath 30-33 (2004).
53 See Brownlee, note 48, at 36-38 (members from both parties eventually supported the
income tax, although it was initially a Democratic Party platform).
54 See id. at 32; Joseph, note 52, at 39.
55 Brownlee, note 48, at 35-36, 38.
56 Joseph, note 52, at 32, 40.
57 Brownlee, note 48, at 37 (discussing Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S.
601 (1895)); Joseph, note 48, at 105-17.
58 Tariff of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112-17.
59 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, tit. 2, 39 Stat. 756, 777-80.
60 Tariff of 1913, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166-81.
61 For this entire episode, see Joseph, note 52, at 105-21; see also Ventry, note 11, at 29-
34 (discussing the period from 1860-1913).
62 Brownlee, note 48, at 44.
63 Id. at 45 tbl.2.3.
64 Id. at 47-50.
65 Id. at 41.
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1% of earners (the effective tax rate in 1944 was 58.6%, with a top
marginal rate of 94%).66 These high rates on the top earners persisted
through the late 1970's and early 1980's (70% top marginal rate), al-
though the effective rate by then had declined to 28.9%.67
Thus, a primary goal of the income tax historically was seen as re-
distributing wealth from the rich to everyone else. This explains why
it was first adopted in the United States, and it also explains why the
income tax is persistently maintained today in developing countries
that could satisfy their entire revenue needs by the VAT. Even
though the personal income tax in these countries has a spotty record,
they insist on maintaining it because of its symbolic potential in
achieving redistribution (although, as I argue below, redistribution in
these countries can be achieved through consumption taxes as well68).
This narrative is of course familiar, but it is useful to revisit it be-
cause of a central claim of modern proponents of consumption taxes
like Bankman and Weisbach, that an ideal consumption tax is as good,
if not superior, at achieving redistributive goals as an ideal income
tax.69 Given that the rich consume a much smaller proportion of their
total income (on average) than the poor,70 and that a consumption tax
by definition does not reach income that is not consumed, how can
this claim be asserted as a true reflection of reality?
The answer lies in the welfarist perspective adopted by Bankman
and Weisbach, as well as other proponents of the consumption tax. 71
From a welfarist perspective, all that matters is increasing the overall
welfare or utility of the individual members of a given society, which
can be measured by using a social welfare function. Under a utilita-
rian social welfare function, the ultimate goal is simply to increase the
sum total of the welfare of members of society. 72 Under other social
welfare functions (for example, a Rawlsian one), the welfare of the
poor weighs more heavily than that of the rich.73 But all welfarist
perspectives share the view that social policies must be measured from
the perspective of changes in individual welfare.
From a welfarist perspective, it then is argued, wealth can have
value only when it is consumed-otherwise, as Daniel Shaviro has
stated (and as Bankman and Weisbach repeat), it is merely the same
66 Id. at 60 tbl.2.5.
67 Id. at 61 tbl.2.6.
68 See text accompanying notes 105-06.
69 Bankman & Weisbach, note 1, at 1414.
70 Bankman and Weisbach note this. Id. at 1440.
71 See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive Consump-
tion Tax, 103 Tax Notes 91 (Apr. 5, 2004).
72 See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy 51 (2d ed. 2005).
73 Id. at 51-52.
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as Monopoly money, and of no real value.7 4 Once this premise is es-
tablished, it becomes easy to "prove" mathematically that a consump-
tion tax is just as good at redistribution as an income tax (although
this is only true for those types of consumption tax that are imposed
on all consumption; prepaid consumption taxes like the flat tax do not
reach economic rents, and therefore do not tax all consumption). 75
Opponents of the consumption tax sometimes have argued (follow-
ing the lead of Henry Simons) that unconsumed wealth is an indepen-
dent source of welfare to the individuals who possess it because it
confers security, political power, or social standing.76 Bankman and
Weisbach argue that these types of intangible benefits also flow ulti-
mately from consumption value and are reduced by taxing consump-
tion.77 I am not persuaded, since the super-rich will never consume
most of their wealth, so it is hard to see what motivates them to qccu-
mulate it if the only value of wealth is in consumption. 78 This debate
within the welfarist tradition will doubtless go on.
Bankman and Weisbach, however, also mention in passing another
argument for the income tax-the redistributive argument as seen
from the perspective of society as a whole, rather than its individual
members: One version of this argument is that failure to tax returns
to saving leaves enormous pools of wealth untaxed, creating vast ine-
qualities in our society.79 Much of that wealth is created because of
general societal conditions such as property rights, an effective gov-
ernment, the legal system, educated workers, natural resources, and
protection from invasions, conditions that have nothing to do with the
fortunate (although skilled and hard-working) individual who earns
great wealth as a result. Society has a right to distribute that wealth as
it sees fit and it is just and fair to use [the income tax] to reduce
inequality.8 0
Bankman and Weisbach then proceed by stating that "[t]he more
technical version of this argument is that transferring a dollar from the
74 Shaviro, note 71, at 106; Bankman & Weisbach, note 1, at 1449.
75 See Bankman & Weisbach, note 1, at 1418-19; Avi-Yonah, note 4, at 1660-61 (discuss-
ing the flat tax).
76 Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case Against Income and Wealth Transfer Taxa-
tion: A Response to Professor McCaffery, 51 Tax L. Rev. 363, 371 (1996); Schenk, note 17,
at 463-67.
77 Bankman & Weisbach, note 1, at 55-56.
78 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity, and Progressive
Taxation (reviewing Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich
(Joel Slemrod ed., 2001), 111 Yale L.J. 1391, 1406-07 (2002).
79 Bankman & Weisbach, note 1, at 1421 n.12 (citing Liam Murphy & Thomas Nagel,
The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice (2002); Stephen Holmes & Cass Sunstein, The
Cost of Rights (1999); Alvin C. Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an
Income Tax, 89 Yale L.J. 1081 (1980)).
80 Bankman & Weisbach, note 1, at 13.
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wealthy to the poor increases welfare because the marginal utility of
money for a wealthy person is likely to be lower than it is for a poor
person. 81 But this is a completely different argument than the one
given above, not a "more technical" version of it. The second argu-
ment is welfarist, and looks at the utility individual members of soci-
ety get from their wealth. The first argument is nonwelfarist: It looks
at the desirable shape of society as a whole, which has nothing to do
with the feelings of individual members. "[E]normous pools of
wealth '82 are from this perspective bad regardless of how much utility
their posessors derive from owning them.
The assumption of the nonwelfarist argument is that any human so-
ciety is more than just the sum of its individual members: It has a
distinct character that distinguishes it from other societies, which are
not interchangeable with it. One of its characteristics is the degree of
inequality of distribution of wealth within it. Other characteristics are
its language, culture, and history. None of these characteristics of
human societies can be reduced to the measurement of individual util-
ities or a social welfare function, since these essentially regard all peo-
ple, and hence all human societies, as interchangeable.
One good measure of the difference between welfarist and
nonwelfarist views of redistribution is the importance of the Gini coef-
ficient, which measures the level of inequality within a given society. 83
Louis Kaplow, writing from a welfarist perspective, has stated that
"there is little need to measure inequality per se. Although inequality
is an aspect of overall social welfare, it is best to measure welfare di-
rectly; measuring inequality requires additional effort and yields no
return."8 4 But from a nonwelfarist perspective that is interested in the
overall character of a given society, measuring inequality can be very
important, and changes in the Gini coefficient can be a direct measure
of the desirability of various policies. In other words, if the goal of a
tax policy is to reduce the unequal distribution of wealth within a soci-
ety per se, then measuring this distribution becomes essential.
But why would one want to reduce inequality? The argument that
"private" wealth is in part a creature of social conditions and there-
fore society can redistribute it "as it sees fit" is not an answer to this
question, because it only legitimizes redistribution, but does not ex-
plain why redistribution is desirable. The answer to this question is
ultimately political: In a democratic society, the majority can legiti-
mately (because of the argument from social conditions given above)
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Robert Burns, Rawls and the Principles of Welfare Law, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 184, 254
(1989).
84 Louis Kaplow, Why Measure Inequality?, 3 J. Econ. Inequality 65, 65 (2005).
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decide to redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor, even if their
only reason is that inequalities are "unfair" or aesthetically offensive
(as they were, for example, to Blum and Kalven).85
Let me suggest, however, three other arguments that contend for
the desirability of redistribution from a societal perspective. The first
two are based on the observation that private concentrations of
wealth confer social and political power. Here, power is considered
from the perspective of the relationship of the rich to the rest of soci-
ety, regardless of whether or not they derive utility from it (when con-
sumed or otherwise). And it is primarily the power to invest, not to
consume, which is at stake-that is, the kind of power that a consump-
tion tax cannot reach.
There are two principal arguments why a democratic state should
curb excessive accumulations of private power.86 The first is the argu-
ment from democracy: In a democracy, all power ultimately should be
accountable to the people. Private accumulations of power are by
definition unaccountable, since the holders of power are neither
elected by the people nor have their power delegated from the peo-
ple's representatives. In fact, the American Revolution was founded
on the conception that while people have natural, Lockean liberal
rights to their property, undue concentrations of private power and
wealth should be discouraged.87 This view found its expression in the
republican creed of civic humanism, which emphasized public virtue
as a balance to private rights. A virtuous republic, the Founders be-
lieved, was to be free from concentrations of economic power such as
characterized England in the eighteenth century.88 Therefore, from
the beginning of the republic, federal and state legislators used taxa-
tion to restrict privilege and to "affirm communal responsibilities,
deepen citizenship, and demonstrate the fiscal virtues of a republican
citizenry. ' '89 As Dennis Ventry has written, "[t]he ideal of civic virtue
created a unique form of ability-to-pay taxation that was hostile to
excess accumulation and to citizens who asserted entitlement through
birth... Inherited wealth, as well as gross concentrations of wealth
(inherited or not), characterized an aristocratic society, not a free and
virtuous republic." 90
85 Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 417, 435-37 (1952).
86 For a similar view, see James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 825 (2001).
87 Ventry, note 11.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 28.
90 Id.
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The other principal argument against excessive private power is
based on a liberal conception of equality. Michael Walzer has ex-
plained that when liberals talk about equality, they are not concerned
with "simple equality", that is, equalizing everyone's initial means. 91
Instead, they are advocating "complex equality," by which Walzer
means that every social "sphere" should have its own appropriate dis-
tributive principles and that possession of goods relevant to one
sphere should not automatically translate into dominance in other
spheres as well. "In formal terms, complex equality means that no
citizen's standing in one sphere or with regard to one social good can
be undercut by his standing in some other sphere, with regard to some
other good." 92 In our capitalist society, money is the "dominant
good," and the people who possess it are the most likely to accumu-
late illegitimate power in other spheres, such as politics. "This domi-
nant good is more or less systematically converted into all sorts of
other things-opportunities, power, and reputation. ' 93 Walzer goes
on to explain the insidious effects of money and why it needs to be
curbed by redistribution, including redistributive taxation:
Market imperialism requires another sort of redistribution,
which is not so much a matter of drawing a line as of redraw-
ing it. What is at issue now is the dominance of money
outside its sphere, the ability of wealthy men and women to
trade in indulgences, purchase state offices, corrupt the
courts, exercise political power . . . The exercise of power
belongs to the sphere of politics, while what goes on in the
market should at least approximate an exchange between
equals (a free exchange)... When money carries with it the
control, not of things only but of people, too, it ceases to be a
private resource. 94
Nor, as noted above, is the power of money limited to direct politi-
cal power:
It would be a mistake to imagine, however, that money has
political effects only when it "talks" to candidates and offi-
cials... It also has political effects closer to home, in the
market itself and in its firms and enterprises ... Even within
the adversary relation of owners and workers, with unions
and grievance procedures in place, owners may still exercise
91 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 18 (1983).
92 Id. at 19.
93 Id. at 12.
94 Id. at 120-21.
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an illegitimate kind of power. They make all sorts of deci-
sions that severely constrain and shape the lives of their em-
ployees (and their fellow citizens, too). Might not the
enormous capital investment represented by plants, furnaces,
machines, and assembly lines be better regarded as a politi-
cal than an economic good? To say this doesn't mean that it
can't be shared among individuals in a variety of ways, but
only that it shouldn't carry the conventional entailments of
ownership. Beyond a certain scale, the means of production
are not properly called commodities .. for they generate a
kind of power that lifts them out of the economic sphere.95
Walzer thus advocates taxation as one means (along with trade un-
ions and limiting property rights) of restricting the market to its
proper sphere.96 But he also recognizes the inherent limitations of all
redistribution, since his aim is not to abolish the market:
All three redistributions redraw the line between politics
and economics, and they do so in ways that strengthen the
sphere of politics-the hand of citizens, that is, not necessa-
rily the power of the state... But however strong their hand,
citizens can't make just any decisions they please. The
sphere of politics has its own boundaries... Hence redistri-
bution can never produce simple equality, not so long as
money and commodities still exist, and there is some legiti-
mate social space within which they can be exchanged.97
The third argument in favor of redistribution from a societal,
nonwelfarist perspective is based on the observation of the negative
effects of extreme inequalities. In particular, as Ted Gurr has shown,
revolutions are most likely to occur in societies that have experienced
a period of economic growth that lifts the standard of living and ex-
pectations of all members of a given society, followed by an external
or internal shock that reduces the standard of living of the majority
while leaving the rich unaffected. 98 This "J-curve" theory of revolu-
tions suggests that rising inequality, even when accompanied by an
improved standard of living for the entire society, poses significant
hazards. Any contemplation of the twentieth century history of coun-
tries like Argentina can show the risks a society runs by ignoring rising
inequality. As Richard Bird and Eric Zolt recently observed: "Sus-
95 Id. at 121-22.
96 Id. at 122-23.
97 Id.
98 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel 46-58 (1970).
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tained excessive inequality in a country, whether generated by the
market or from governmental policy, may not be sustainable over
time." 99 Or as Aristotle noted long before them, "when there is no
middle class, and the poor greatly exceed in number, troubles arise,
and the state soon comes to an end."100
As I have argued at length elsewhere, all three of these considera-
tions underlay the thinking of the Progressive lawmakers who enacted
the corporate and individual income taxes (and the estate tax) in the
early twentieth century. 01 They were opposed to allowing vast con-
centrations of wealth on both democratic and egalitarian grounds, and
they were acutely aware of the hazards of permitting inequality to
grow unchecked even against the background of generally rising living
standards, as illustrated by contemporary events in Russia and else-
where in Europe.10 2
Moreover, it is abundantly clear that what concerned the Progres-
sives was increasing inequality of wealth, not consumption. 0 3 They
would have rejected as absurd the contention that a consumption tax
can be as redistributive as an income tax, precisely because their goal
was to alter the distribution of unconsumed wealth in the United
States. The existing tax instruments, a federal-level consumption tax
and a state-level personal property tax, could not achieve significant
redistribution of wealth, the first because it failed to reach uncon-
sumed wealth, and the second because of administrative limitations on
taxing intangible wealth. Hence they adopted the estate tax and the
corporate and individual income taxes, which together were expected
to reach most sources of wealth (that is, inheritances plus wealth
earned during one's lifetime).
I would argue that the same arguments can support redistributive
taxation in the twenty-first century as well. We are again living in an
era of sharply rising inequality of wealth, fueled primarily by global-
ization and technological progress. But globalization and its benefits
are threatened by a backlash driven by the very inequalities it has
produced. This backlash currently can be seen both in rising protec-
tionism in the United States and in the rejection of the EU constitu-
99 Bird & Zolt, note 12, at 1660.
100 Aristotle, Politics, bk. 4 ch 11, available at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.
html; see Kim M. Bloomquist, Tax Evasion, Income Inequality and Opportunity Costs of
Compliance, 96 Proc Ann. Conf. on Tax'n 91 (2003) (examining effect of income inequality
on tax evasion levels).
101 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the Corpo-
rate Tax, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1193, 1215-31 (2004).
102 Id. at 16-29.
103 Id. at 16-22.
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tion.104 If globalization is to be maintained, and to avoid a retreat like
the 1920's, it is essential to deal with the problem of inequality, and to
adequately fund a social safety net.
Even if one agrees, however, that redistribution of wealth is desira-
ble as a goal of tax policy, it is not clear that the income tax is the best
policy instrument to achieve this. Richard Bird and Eric Zolt recently
have written a compelling article arguing that in developing countries,
redistribution can be achieved more effectively by using consumption
taxes and spending policies in redistributive fashion, rather than by
relying on income taxation (although they do not advocate repeal of
the existing income taxes in developing countries, primarily because
of their symbolic value).' 05
Redistribution through income taxation certainly has limits. The
U.S. experience in particular has shown that extremely high rates im-
posed on the rich lead to increased avoidance and evasion. Moreover,
the use of the income tax for regulatory purposes frequently has
clashed with its redistributive goals. Thus, Joseph Pechman and Ben-
jamin Okner found in 1966 (when the top income tax rate was 70%106)
that the U.S. tax system did not exert any major influence on the dis-
tribution of income, and a follow-up study by Pechman found the
same result for the period between 1966 and 1985.107
So should we only use consumption taxes to fund government activ-
ities, and rely entirely on the spending side to reduce inequality? The
answer is no, for three reasons. First, it is politically dangerous to rely
entirely on spending decisions for redistribution. Second, experience
in other countries has shown that the income tax can have significant
redistributive effect. And finally, the use of income and wealth taxa-
tion has important symbolic value.
The first argument is that to rely entirely on spending programs for
redistribution, and therefore accept repeal of the income tax, is dan-
gerous in the current U.S. political climate. The income tax today is
significantly progressive: According to 2001 IRS data, the top 1% of
the U.S. population by adjusted gross income paid 33.89% of federal
personal income taxes, and the top 5% paid 53.25%. (By comparison,
the bottom 50% of the AGI distribution paid less than 4% of total
104 See Richard Bernstein, 2 No Votes in Europe: The Anger Spreads, N.Y. Times, June
2, 2005 at Al (discussing the rejection of the EU Constitution).
105 Bird & Zolt, note 12, at 1694-95.
106 IRS, Table A-U.S. Individual Income Tax: Personal Exemption and Lowest and
Highest Bracket Tax Rates, and Tax Base for Regular Tax, Tax Years 1913-2005, http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/histaba/pdf.
107 Joseph A. Pechman & Benjamin A. Okner, Who Bears the Tax Burden? 4-10 (1974);
Joseph A. Pechman, Who Paid the Taxes, 1966-85?, at 8-10 (1985).
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income taxes collected). 10 8 This is a significant increase from 1994,
when the top 1% of taxpayers only paid 28.9% of federal personal
income taxes.10 9 In 2004, even after President Bush's tax cuts, the top
1% still paid 32.3% of federal individual income taxes and the top 5%
paid 53.7%.11° Any consumption tax is likely to be significantly more
regressive than these figures indicate. Relying on spending programs
to redress the redistributive imbalance is politically risky because
spending programs that are means tested (and thus benefit the poor
the most) are politically unpopular.
Second, there is considerable evidence that in developed countries,
the income tax can play an important role in redistribution. For exam-
ple, a 2000 study by the International Monetary Fund showed that
while income inequality before tax and transfer programs was actually
higher in developed countries than in developing countries, developed
countries (but not developing countries) were successful in using tax
and transfer programs to reduce inequality.11 There is no suggestion
in the study that this reduction of inequality resulted only from the
transfer programs. A 2003 study of the Canadian tax and transfer sys-
tem showed that it is significantly redistributive, and that while two-
thirds of the redistribution is achieved via the transfer system, the re-
maining third is due to the income tax.112 As Bird and Zolt write:
"Despite the many qualifications we have noted, the income tax, and
particularly the personal income tax, is probably the only significantly
progressive element found in most tax systems. 11 3 Given that no
consumption tax by definition can achieve the same level of redistri-
bution of unconsumed wealth as the income tax, and that redistribu-
tion of unconsumed wealth continues to be an important policy goal,
the income tax should be retained.
Finally, income taxation has an important symbolic value. To a large
extent, current U.S. dissatisfaction with the income tax stems from the
perception that it is not progressive enough-that is, that the rich can
avoid paying their "fair share. 1 14 The result of this dissatisfaction has
108 Press Release, Joint Economic Committee, New IRS Data on Income and Tax Shares
(Sept. 26, 2003) (on file with the Tax Law Review).
109 Id.
110 Congressional Budget Office, Effective Federal Tax Rates Under Current Law, 2001
to 2014 tbl.2 (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=5746&
sequence=1.
111 Ke-Young Chu, Hamid Davoodi & Sanjeev Gupta, Income Distribution and Tax and
Government Social Spending Policies in Developing Countries 36 (IMF Working Paper
No. 00/62), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=879546.
112 Andrew Sharpe, Linkages Between Economic Growth and Inequality: Introduction
and Overview, 29 Can. Pub. Pol. S1, S6 (2003).
113 Bird & Zolt, note 12, at 1682-83.
114 See John Braithwaite, Markets in Vice Markets in Virtue (2005).
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been attempts to ensure that the rich pay their "fair share" (like the
AMT), and attempts to reduce opportunities and incentives for avoid-
ance by broadening the tax base while reducing the top rate (the 1986
tax reform). Both of these may have failed, but the solution is not to
abandon the effort to tax the rich by adopting a consumption tax. It is
always hard to persuade the majority to pay their taxes when it is per-
ceived that the wealthy minority do not pay theirs. A commitment to
progressivity in taxation is an important symbolic bulwark for the le-
gitimacy of the tax system as a whole.
Nevertheless, I do agree that the time has come to abandon the
century-old attempt to achieve redistribution of wealth in the United
States entirely through the income and estate taxes. We know more
now about the inherent limitations of these taxes in achieving redistri-
bution than the Progressives knew 100 years ago. We cannot go back
to the pre-1980 rate structure, and we will not abandon the use of the
tax system as a regulatory tool, which underlies most avoidance tech-
niques, or "loopholes." Nor are we any closer to solving the practical
problems inherent in taxing income, such as the realization require-
ment. Globalization and tax competition for capital also introduce
their own limitations on taxing capital too highly, although it is impor-
tant to note that their effects have not been significant so far in devel-
oped countries. 115
Thus, a different kind of tax is needed in addition to the income tax.
A wealth tax is an obvious candidate to achieve wealth redistribution,
but it is problematic politically (as shown by the revolt against local
property taxes and unpopularity of the estate tax), constitutionally (a
federal direct wealth tax without apportionment is probably unconsti-
tutional) and administratively (because of liquidity and valuation
issues).
Thus, I believe the solution is a federal level consumption tax-spe-
cifically, a VAT similar to the ones used successfully in all other
OECD countries. If this tax is enacted in addition to, and not as a
replacement of, the income tax, the revenues under current political
conditions are likely to be used for universal entitlement programs
like Social Security and Medicare. These programs are far more polit-
ically resilient than programs aimed solely at the poor, and are inher-
ently redistributive. Thus, there is little risk that the revenues from
the new (regressive) additional consumption tax would not be spent in
a progressive fashion-which is not the case if the consumption tax
replaced the income tax, because then it would fund the same federal
programs as the income tax does now, with no increase in progressiv-
115 For a discussion of why this is the case, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, All of a Piece
Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S. International Taxation, 25 Va. Tax. Rev. 313 (2005).
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ity and no solution for the actuarial deficit of the entitlement pro-
grams, other than cutting benefits.
IV. REGULATION
"[T]he power to tax involves the power to destroy...-116
John Marshall
The previous two Parts have shown that a combination of revenue
and redistributive goals explains the two puzzles I posed in the begin-
ning: Why most countries have both income and consumption taxes,
and why the United States switched from taxing consumption to tax-
ing income a century ago. But there is a third puzzle I have not yet
addressed, which is the surprising political resiliency of both the indi-
vidual and corporate income taxes in the past twenty-five years. Since
the 1980's, there has been a growing consensus among academics that
the consumption tax is superior to the income tax, at least on effi-
ciency and administrability grounds. And yet, there has not been
much response among politicians in the United States (or elsewhere)
to the call for substituting the income tax with a consumption tax. 117
Part of the explanation no doubt lies in the revenue and redistribu-
tion arguments outlined above-politicians tend to like tax revenues,
and redistribution still has strong support among voters (a point I re-
turn to later). But I would suggest that a stronger reason for the polit-
ical resistance exists, and that is the third function of the income tax-
as a regulatory tool.
The income tax, and in particular the corporate income tax, had
been seen as a potential regulatory tool from the beginning. President
Taft, in proposing the corporate tax in 1909, had emphasized its regu-
latory potential: By adopting the tax, he said, the government can
achieve "supervisory control of corporations which may prevent a fur-
ther abuse of power. '118 And in adopting and developing the reor-
ganization provisions from 1918 onward,119 the United States began a
long series of measures designed to reward some forms of corporate
activity and deter others.
The heyday, however, of using the income tax as a regulatory tool
was in the post World War II period. This was part of a general ten-
dency to entrust regulatory powers to the state-the so-called "golden
116 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819).
117 Even the Tax Reform Panel Report rejects this proposal. See Tax Reform Panel
Report, note 15, at 192, 208; see Avi-Yonah, note 16, at 567.
118 44 Cong. Rec. 3, 3344 (1909) (statement of President Taft).
119 Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1060.
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period of the nation state.' 2 0 In the 1960's and 1970's, in particular,
hundreds of provisions were added to the Code to influence invest-
ment and spending decisions by both individuals and corporations.
The problem, of course, was that these regulatory provisions ("tax
expenditures") clashed with the other goals of taxation-they made
the income tax less effective in both raising revenue and as a redistrib-
utive tool, since most of the tax expenditures were aimed at the rich.
In addition, the tax expenditures made the Code far more complex.
The result was a backlash led by academics like Stanley Surrey, who
wanted to restore the tax law to its "pure" functions of revenue raising
and redistribution and achieve regulatory aims directly by subsidies
and direct regulation. 21 The movement began in the adoption of the
AMT in 1969122 (designed to reduce the ability of the rich to use tax
expenditures to avoid taxation below a certain minimum) and
culminated in the adoption of the tax expenditure budget in 1974,123
and in the Tax Reform Act of 1986,124 which closed hundreds of
"loopholes."
As we now know, these achievements of the anti-tax expenditure
movement were transitory. The AMT has become a burden on the
middle class; the tax expenditure budget had no discernible effect on
the willingness of Congress to adopt and expand tax expenditures; and
the 1986 compromise unraveled in the 1990's, which saw a plethora of
new targeted tax incentives. The trend shows no sign of abating, as
exemplified by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004125 and the
Energy Policy Act of 2005.126
Tax expenditure purists bewail this trend, but I believe they are mis-
taken. As Weisbach and Nussim have shown, there is no particular a
priori reason why tax expenditures are better or worse than direct
subsidies. 127 And as other students of regulation have noted, deter-
ring harmful activities via taxation sometimes can be more effective
than direct regulation (consider, for example, Prohibition vs. taxes on
120 See Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Ruschmeyer & Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back
In (1985); Bo Rothstein & Sven Steinmo, Restructuring the Welfare State: Political Insti-
tutions and Policy Change (2002).
121 Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures
(1973).
122 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 301, 83 Stat. 487, 580.
123 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88
Stat. 297.
124 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
125 Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418.
126 Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594.
127 David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs,
113 Yale L.J. 955, 977-82 (2004).
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alcohol consumption). 128 Even if these arguments are rejected, as Bo-
ris Bittker and others have argued, 12 9 the choice of what is and is not a
tax expenditure lies very much in the eye of the beholder. Thus, we
are unlikely to ever have a pure income (or a pure consumption) tax.
Moreover, the political appeal of regulating via the Code is im-
mense. It gives significant power to the tax writing committees, and
enhances the role of lobbyists (who are frequently former members of
the tax writing committees). This political reality means that efforts to
eliminate regulation via taxation probably are doomed. Even Presi-
dent Bush conceded this reality when he instructed the Tax Reform
Commission to refrain from touching two of the most popular tax ex-
penditures (the home mortgage interest and charitable deduction),130
even though this severely limited the tax reform options they could
consider (for example, it eliminated the option of a national sales tax).
This, then, is the third goal of taxation: regulation of private sector
activity by rewarding activities that are considered desirable (via de-
ductions or credits) and deterring activities that are considered unde-
sirable (via increased taxation). A major portion of the current Code
can only be understood as fulfilling this regulatory function.
What are the implications for tax reform? Some private activities
can best be regulated by consumption taxes-consumption activities.
In fact, if the goal of the government is to deter consumption of cer-
tain items (for example, tobacco, alcohol or gasoline), excise taxes on
these items are the most effective way of achieving this aim-far bet-
ter than denying an income tax deduction. General consumption
taxes are also widely used (although this use is more controversial) to
impose extra taxes on some items (luxuries) and lower taxes on others
(food and medicine). (It should be noted, however, that the aim of
these provisions frequently is to abate regressivity, which can be
achieved better by spending programs.)
But most of the regulatory function of taxation relates not to con-
sumption, but to investment and saving behavior. The biggest tax ex-
penditures in all countries tend to be those that encourage individuals
to invest for certain goals (for example, retirement, housing or educa-
tion).131 Other important ones are designed to encourage corporate
128 See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Der-
egulation Debate (1992); Braithwaite, note 114.
129 See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National
Budget, 22 Nat'l Tax J. 244 (1969); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, The Tax Expen-
diture Budgets: A Critical View, 54 Tax Notes 1661 (Mar. 30, 1992).
130 Exec. Order No. 13,369, 3 C.F.R. 2323 (2005) (ordering that the panel's recommen-
dations should "recogniz[e] the importance of homeownership and charity in American
society").
131 See, e.g., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Budget of the
United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007 285, 288 tbl.19-1.
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investments (for example, accelerated depreciation, investment tax
credits). 132 These types of regulation can be achieved only in the con-
text of a system that taxes individual and corporate income, not
consumption.
In a cash flow type consumption tax, all individual savings are de-
ductible, and all corporate capital expenditures are expensed. 133 This
encourages savings and investment in general. But it does nothing to
draw these distinctions that are at the heart of regulatory uses of the
Code: to encourage individuals and corporations to save and invest in
some purposes but not in others. There can be no preference for sav-
ing for retirement or for college tuition for individuals, no accelerated
depreciation for some types of corporate investment but not others.134
Some, of course, would say that it is a good thing for government to
get out of the way and just support savings and investment in general
via a consumption tax, without trying to influence particular savings or
investment decisions. But others would support a role for the govern-
ment, especially where it is shown that a market failure exists or when
individuals behave in a systematically irrational way. For those who
believe in a continued regulatory role in taxation, the maintenance of
both an individual and corporate income tax is essential, since a con-
sumption tax by definition cannot be used to regulate savings and in-
vestment decisions.
Regardless of one's position on the desirability of regulation via
taxation, the inescapable reality is that politicians are unlikely to give
up on this tool. The 1986 tax reform after all was widely conceded to
be an aberration, and it unraveled over time (in part, because it car-
ried the seeds of its own destruction, like the mechanism for a capital
gains preference). 135 But even the 1986 Act involved far less regula-
tory abstinence than a complete repeal of taxation of savings. This, I
believe, is the principal reason the current effort to replace the income
tax with a consumption tax will fail.' 36
132 Id.
133 See, e.g., Treasury Dep't, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 9 (1977).
134 In theory, one could imagine tax preferences being given for investment activities
within the context of a consumption tax by granting more generous treatment than expens-
ing to certain activities but not to others. See, e.g., IRC § 168(f)(8) (before repeal in 1982)
(treatment of finance leases in 1981-1982). But it is hard to imagine such a system raising
sufficient revenue.
135 See generally Gary Mucciaroni, Public Choice and the Politics of Comprehensive Tax
Reform, Governance, Jan. 1990, at 1, 1-32.
136 Strikingly, the Tax Reform Panel Report rejected any proposal for a pure consump-
tion tax, proposing instead either a streamlined income tax (the "Simplified Income Tax",
or SIT) or a partial consumption tax with an added tax on income from capital (the
"Growth and Investment Tax", or GIT). Tax Reform Panel Report, note 15, at 59. If even
a panel designed to advance consumption tax proposals failed to reach consensus, it seems
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V. CONCLUSION: WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD TAX BOTH
INCOME AND CONSUMPTION
I began by conceding, for argument's sake, the superiority of the
consumption tax to the income tax on the three traditional policy
grounds of efficiency, equity, and administrability. I then said that this
result poses two puzzles: Why do most countries use both income and
consumption taxes, and why the United States chose to switch from
taxing consumption to taxing income. The answer, I argued, lies in
the three functions of taxation: revenue, redistribution, and regula-
tion. The revenue function explains why for most countries (although
not yet for the United States), both income and consumption taxes are
needed to support the social safety net.137 The redistributive function,
properly seen as redistributing unconsumed wealth, explains why the
United States adopted the income tax and why even developing coun-
tries insist on retaining an income tax.138 The regulatory function ex-
plains the political resiliency of the income tax, since only by taxing
savings can politicians regulate savings and investment behavior.
And yet, consumption taxes are needed for all three functions. A
consumption tax is needed to raise revenue whenever the public sec-
tor requires more revenue than can be raised by the income tax.1 39
Redistribution to a large extent can be achieved more effectively by
taxing consumption broadly and using the spending side of the budget
to achieve progressivity. 140 And consumption itself is more easily reg-
ulated by consumption taxes than by an income tax.
What are the policy implications of this argument? Two major im-
plications can be drawn. First, it is unlikely that the United States will
in fact substitute a pure consumption tax for the income tax, although
it is possible that some movement will be made to expand the con-
sumption tax features of the current income tax. Second, I believe the
United States should follow the rest of the world and adopt a con-
sumption tax (specifically, a VAT) in addition to the income tax.
The unlikelihood of radical tax reform in the United States stems
directly from the role of the income tax in all three of the above func-
tions, and from the observation that in the last decade, consumption
highly unlikely that Congress can even adopt such a radical reform. See Avi-Yonah, note
16, at 551, 568-86.
137 Junko Kato, Regressive Taxation and the Welfare State 14 (2003).
138 Bird & Zolt, note 12, at 1627 (acknowledging that in developing countries the in-
come tax has long been viewed as the primary instrument for redistributing income and
challenging that assertion).
139 See note 18 and accompanying text.
140 See Bankman & Weisbach, note 1, at 1428-30; Donald W. Kiefer, Measurement of
the Progressivity of Public Expenditures and Net Fiscal Incidence: Comment, 50 S. Econ.
J. 578, 578-86 (1983) (critiquing a recent methodology for measuring the progressivity of
public expenditure).
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tax proposals have gained political traction only to the extent they
resembled an income tax.141 Since the 1990's, three major tax reform
proposals have been made repeatedly in one form or another: the
national sales tax, the flat tax, and the cash flow tax. Of these, only
the cash flow tax has had any political success, precisely because it
comes closer than the other two to achieving the three goals of taxa-
tion outlined above; that is, it more closely resembles an income tax.
The national sales tax is the most obvious form of consumption tax.
It achieves consumption tax treatment directly by taxing only con-
sumption transactions, and enables Congress to abolish both the Code
and the hated IRS. But this proposal has gone nowhere: It does not
bring in adequate revenue (because of inherent administrability con-
straints on a single stage sales tax); it is purely regressive; and it elimi-
nates any regulatory potential at the federal level. Despite the
enthusiasm of prominent Republicans, this proposal has no future.1 42
The flat tax (or its cousin the X tax) has had more appeal.1 43 It
brings in adequate revenue, and because corporations still are taxed
(albeit on a cash flow basis), it has some regulatory potential at the
corporate level. Moreover, it has the potential to maintain a progres-
sive tax on wages. But the complete exclusion of interest, dividends,
and capital gains from the tax base probably dooms it on redistribu-
tive grounds. If even President Bush's proposal to exempt dividends
(with the double tax argument behind it) could not get enacted in a
Republican Congress, and if the President's own tax reform panel re-
jected a pure flat tax and added a 15% tax on income from capital, 44
it is hard to believe an all-out exemption for all investment income
(even rents used for consumption) can get enacted.
The only proposal that has had some traction is thus the cash flow
proposal: to tax both individuals and corporations on a cash flow ba-
sis, allowing the expensing of capital expenditures at the corporate
level and a full deduction of savings at the individual level. 145 This
proposal maintains adequate revenue and some potential for regula-
tion. As far as redistribution is concerned, it taxes rents and maintains
the graduated rate structure.
141 See Richard W. Stevenson, Itching to Rebuild the Tax Law, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24,
2002, at B1, Bl.
142 Edmund L. Andrews & David A. Kirkpatrick, G.O.P. Constituencies Split on Tax
Change, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 2004, at C1, C7. It was summarily rejected by the Tax Re-
form Panel. Tax Reform Panel Report, note 15, at 207.
143 See generally David F. Bradford, Tax Reform: Waiting for a New Consensus of the
Experts (May 18, 1998), 98 TNT 95-74, May 18, 1998, available in LEXIS, TNT File.
144 Tax Reform Panel Report, note 15, at xiv, 39-40, 59.
145 See, e.g., James M. Bickley, Cong. Research Serv., Flat Tax Proposals and Funda-
mental Reform: An Overview 4-7 (Sept. 30, 2004) (discussing recent congressional propos-
als for flat consumption taxes based on cash flow).
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And yet, I do not believe even this proposal can get enacted. Fun-
damentally, it comes down to the question whether the American
public believes in the version of redistribution proposed by Bankman
and Weisbach, that is, redistribution only from an individual perspec-
tive, based on welfarist premises, in which individuals only value con-
sumption; or whether it still believes the version of redistribution laid
out above, namely redistribution of unconsumed wealth as a legiti-
mate goal of tax policy.146 If it is the latter, it is highly unlikely that
Congress will accept the distributive tables showing the impact of a
tax reform proposal that allows the rich an unlimited savings deduc-
tion. It is more likely that some compromise will be struck, expanding
the range of deductible savings for the middle class but with limits on
the rich. This will result in moving the current income tax more in the
direction of a consumption tax, but without abandoning income taxa-
tion of the rich. It is similar in this regard to current compromise pro-
posals that keep the estate tax for the ultra rich. 147
But in the longer run, the current situation is not tenable. Once the
baby boomers reach retirement age in large numbers, the costs of So-
cial Security and in particular Medicare will become so high that the
need for either cutting benefits or additional revenues will be ines-
capable. 148 At that point, I believe the political dynamic from other
OECD countries will repeat itself, and we will end up with a VAT in
addition to the income tax.
As stated above, consumption taxes have many advantages. Al-
though I am not truly willing to concede their superiority on the tradi-
tional measures of efficiency, equity, and administrability (a point I
have addressed elsewhere 49), I believe they-and in particular the
VAT-have a lot to offer in fulfilling the three goals of taxation set
out above. Because of this, I support adopting a VAT in addition to
the income tax in the United States. As other countries have learned
from experience, the VAT is an important tool for revenue, redistribu-
tion, and regulation. Its details, and how to get there from here, I
leave for another day.150
146 See Part II.
147 See, e.g., Nonna A. Noto, Cong. Research Serv., Estate Tax Legislation in the 108th
Congress CRS 4-12 (May 14, 2004) (discussing recent congressional proposals to raise the
estate tax exclusion amount).
148 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Address Before the Washington Eco-
nomic Club: The Coming Demographic Transition: Will We Treat Future Generations
Fairly? (Oct. 4, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boardDocs/speeches/
2006/20061004/default.htm.
149 Avi-Yonah, note 4.
150 For a preliminary discussion, see generally id.
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